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chapter 1 0
Night Fight
Clare Mac Cumhaill
When the Romanian existentialist writer E. M. Cioran died in 1995, it was
reputed that he had not slept for more than half a century. A ‘career
insomniac’, Cioran claimed to have stopped sleeping at the age of seven-
teen, after which time, by his own account, everything he wrote – all his
‘divagations’ – issued from his insomnia. Regier remarks that the poet wore
his pyjamas ‘like a hairshirt’ (2004 : 994), insomnia a kind of blissful
martyrdom which, despite the ‘heights of despair’ that his sleeplessness
induced, brought its own ‘blessings’:
Just as ecstasy puriﬁes you of the particular and the contingent, leaving
nothing except light and darkness, so insomnia kills oﬀ the multiplicity and
diversity of the world, leaving you prey to your private obsessions. What
strangely enchanted tunes gush forth during those sleepless nights! Their
ﬂowing tones are bewitching, but there is a note of regret in this melodic
surge which keeps it short of ecstasy. What kind of regret? It is hard to say,
because insomnia is so complex that one cannot tell what the loss is. (Cioran
1992: 83)
In this chapter1 I explore to what extent, and along what dimensions, a link
between regret, wakefulness, and insomnia can be excavated – and, as I will
show, Cioran’s lyric phenomenology speaks somewhat obliquely to this
connection. But in doing so, I also aim to explicitly echo something of
Cioran’s diﬃculty in ﬁnding it ‘hard to say’ just what the peculiar loss of
regret is, or, cast diﬀerently, what its proper object is. It is striking that the
philosophical literature on regret should be likewise undecided, variously
1 Some of the ideas in this chapter arose out of discussion with Edoardo Zamuner and owe much to
him. I am grateful too to the thumos research group, Geneva, from whose activities and support I have
greatly beneﬁtted. Work for this chapter was started while a post-doc on the Swiss National Science
Foundation project ‘The Intentionality the Mark of the Mental’. I also thank participants of the
‘Dream, Sleep, Emotion’ workshop which I organised in September 2013 in Geneva, and Ralph
Schmidt, whose work on the aﬀective dimensions of insomnia prompted this exploration. I thank
Hichem Naar and Fabrice Teroni for their thoughtful comments on a ﬁrst draft.
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oﬀering, among other things, states of aﬀairs (Williams 1976), blunders
(Jacobson 2013), valuable unchosen alternatives supported by reasons
(Bagnoli 2000), and objects of attachment, including one’s own life
(Wallace 2014). My dialectical strategy will be to try to show that such
multiplicity can be read as speaking not just, or even primarily, to the
potential variety of the objects of regret, but also to aspects of its ontology.
In particular, my exploration will attempt to uncover regret’s relationship to
time through consideration of the nature of the wakeful state. Further, it will
consider the extent to which the mental activities of thinking and imagining
which intuitively accompany regret are partly constitutive of it. I will argue
that such activities may sometimes be helpfully understood asmental expres-
sive actions – a category of expressive action so far neglected in the literature.
A leading thread of my argument is to suggest that regret is an aﬀective state
of the wakeful. The puzzle that frames my ‘divagation’ is why the state of
regret is notmerely incompatiblewith sleep but precludes falling asleep – that is
why regret may occasionally be, to coin a word, insomniacal.My conclusion is
that those episodes of regretting that are insomniacal have a peculiarly self-
reﬂexive character that reﬂection on the ontological character of occurrent
regret helpsmake articulate: they bear a certain relation to the subject who is in
that occurrent state.2 To this extent, disputes over the proper object of regret,
insofar as I engage with them, act only as a prism through which my primary
concern can be brought into view – the link between regret, wakefulness, and,
ultimately, insomnia. That regret may be variously theorised as having very
diﬀerent proper objects is, I explain, symptomatic of the fact that the state of
wakeful consciousness is itself complex, a complexity that reﬂection on the
nature of regret reveals and, I suggest, replicates.
The analysis I oﬀer hinges fairly uncritically on the insight of Brian
O’Shaughnessy, and in particular his ‘Anatomy of Consciousness’ in
Consciousness and the World, which I detail in §§1–2.3 For the most part,
it cleaves closely to O’Shaughnessy’s analysis, applying it to the case of
regret. In this sense, this chapter is synthetic and expository, though along
the way some novel claims are drawn, speciﬁcally regarding the link
between regret and mental activity. We can get an early glimpse at this
connection by noting what Janet Landman in her expansive Regret calls the
‘occasions of regret’.
2 For discussion of the ontological category of occurrent state, see Soteriou (2013).
3 Some aspects of O’Shaughnessy’s proposal require further defence or are questionable. For the
purposes of this chapter, the idea is only to set out the general explanatory framework. See also
Matthew Soteriou’s chapter in this volume (Chapter 4). In various respects, I am also indebted to a
reading of Soteriou (2013).
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Landman notes a link between the availability of time for thoughtful
reﬂection and regret. Reﬂectiveness, she says, is typically enhanced when
alone and unencumbered by daily tasks and hence ‘by far the single most
frequently reported time for regret [is] evening or night-time’ (1993:
204 ).4 Likewise, Schmidt and Van der Linden observe that ‘bedtime
may often be the ﬁrst quiet period in the course of the day available to
review one’s own behaviour’ (2013: 873) and that ‘this time windowmight
be particularly suitable for the emergence of feelings of regret, shame and
guilt’ (873). But if regret typically emerges at the ‘ﬁrst quiet period’ of the
day, the link between bedtime and regretting is no surprise – it is a mere
correlation. That regret may preclude sleep – as Schmidt and his colla-
borator also seek to establish – is more mysterious.5 Why should regret
induce insomnia?
Like other writers, Schmidt and Van der Linden take it that regret is a
counterfactual emotion. Zeelenberg and Pieters gloss this as follows:
Feeling regret requires the ability to imagine other possibilities than the
current state of the world. One has to reﬂect on one’s choices and the
outcomes generated by these choices, but one also has to reﬂect on what
other outcomes might have been obtained by making a diﬀerent choice. Put
diﬀerently, regret is a counterfactual emotion. (2007 : 5)
Regret, then, involves mental activity. But in what sense is this mental
activity aﬀective? The authors do not say. They do, however, make a
suggestive remark in passing: regret ‘both stems from, and produces, higher
order cognitive processes’ (5). Part of my exploration will be to consider
just how the higher-order processes of actively thinking and imaginingmay
be involved in regretting in this dual sense. As I explain, however, while
certain patterns of thought and imagining may well produce feelings of
regret, and while regret may in turn precipitate further thoughts and
imaginings, there is also reason to think that at least some thoughts and
imaginings may be constitutively regretful in the sense that they may be
understood not as productive of, nor as produced by regret, but rather as
expressions of regret.
The chapter unfolds as follows: in §1, I sketch Brian O’Shaughnessy
analysis of wakeful consciousness (readers familiar with O’Shaughnessy’s
4 Jacobson implicitly notes a connection between regret and nocturnal wakefulness. In discussing an
individual for whom feelings of regret would not be appropriate, he notes: ‘If any unwanted feeling
keeps her up at night, it is more likely anxiety’ (2013: 101).
5 Schmidt and Van der Linden (2011) provide empirical evidence showing a correlation between self-
reported regret and insomnia.
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work can skip this section). I explain that although on certain accounts of
regret the proper object of the emotion lies in the past, the kind of temporal
orientation that wakefulness enables cannot yet explain the link between
regret, wakefulness, and, speciﬁcally, insomnia (§2). I then focus on the
question framed earlier: assuming that regret involves mental activity, in
what sense is that mental activity aﬀective? In this part of my discussion, I
draw on the illuminating work of Carla Bagnoli, and more narrowly on her
divergence from BernardWilliams concerning the proper object of regret. I
pick up her disagreement with Williams to motivate the claim that some-
times the mental activity that occurs in regret can be understood as
expressive, in turn bringing work by Peter Goldie to bear on a number of
suggestive comments that Williams makes when elucidating his celebrated
conception of agent-regret in ‘Moral Luck’ (§§3–4). In particular, I bring
two features of Williams’ characterisation of so-called agent-regret (in a
sense to be made plain) into synchrony: the idea that agent-regret involves
a particularmode of expression. And the thought that regret involves a wish.
Linking these, I will suggest that the mental activity that attends and as I
claim partly constitutes regret is in fact expressive of a wish: namely the wish
that things were otherwise was satisﬁed now.
In closing, I return to the puzzle that Cioran’s despair makes striking:
the puzzle as to why occurrent regret is not merely incompatible with sleep,
but may preclude falling asleep. I oﬀer a tentative response in closing,
focusing on the self-conscious character of occurrent regret (§5).
1 O’Shaughnessy on the State of Wakeful Consciousness
ForO’Shaughnessy, consciousness is ‘that vastly familiar light that appears in
the head when a person surfaces from sleep or anaesthesia or dream. In other
words with the state we call “waking”’ (2000: 68). The ‘problem of con-
sciousness’, as he understands it, is not, then, what theorists have elsewhere
referred to as the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness – after all, the hard
problem arises as much for sensory experience in dream as it does for wakeful
experience. Rather the problemO’Shaughnessy addresses is what the correct
analysis of wakeful consciousness is, where he takes it that wakeful con-
sciousness is only one among a variety of states of consciousness of which the
wakeful state of consciousness is the ‘parent sub-variety’.6 I spell out this
peculiar taxonomic terminology.
6 Somewhat confusingly, O’Shaughnessy refers to wakeful consciousness as consciousness. For clarity, I
systematically refer to wakeful consciousness.
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As O’Shaughnessy explains, every living animal is in some state of
consciousness. But, accordingly, consciousness does not relate to uncon-
sciousness as life relates to death –
[w]hereas the paths to death lead to the monolithic state of death, the paths
leading away from consciousness conduct one in diﬀerent directions
towards diverse states. (70)
– speciﬁcally, they lead one to the states of sleep or unconsciousness.
And sometimes wakeful consciousness itself can be ‘disordered’, in a sense
to be made plain.
In sorting among these states of consciousness and in insisting that wakeful
consciousness is the ‘parent sub-variety’, O’Shaughnessy makes plain his
methodology. We are not, he says, dealing with real essences or natural
kinds. Rather, diverse states of consciousness can be individuated a priori:
Conceptually we begin with [properly formed wakeful] consciousness and
privatively derive the others by denuding it of powers. The state of waking
marshals our central mental powers – to experience, sense-perceive, think,
and reason cogently and actively manipulate the environment with a view to
fulﬁlling our needs – and all other states are noteworthy for the absence of
some or even all of the above. (70)
His methodology, then, is to descriptively analyse diverse states of con-
sciousness by considering what such ‘denuded’ states of consciousness fail to
enable in their owner. For example, deepest unconsciousness involves the
‘total suspension’ (73) of psychological events – the subject is divested of the
powers to imagine, sense-perceive, and reason – while light sleep permits
dreaming. Likewise, drunkenness may inhibit or, occasionally, enhance
certain powers (see Crowther forthcoming a, 2016 for discussion – curiously,
O’Shaughnessy thinks that the drunk are not properly awake).
An important power that O’Shaughnessy discusses involves the ability to
apply the indexical ‘now’. A dreamless sleeper cannot entertain beliefs about
the present instant picked out as ‘now’: ‘[i]f he fell asleep at 6.00 a.m., and
awoke at 6.10 a.m., he cannot at 6.05 a.m. entertain a belief about the instant
6.05 a.m. singled out as “now”’ (51). But since a non-experiencer cannot be
conscious of an instant singled out as ‘now’, nor can such a subject be aware of
a succession of ‘nows’ and, hence, of the passage of time. I revisit the import
of time shortly.7 For now let us remark inwhat sensewakeful consciousness is
7 Interestingly, experience of the passage of time is less pertinent to an account of the phenomenology
of regretting than temporal orientation is. Experience of passage does, however, seem to be central to
the phenomenology of insomnia, but I leave this unexplored.
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the ‘parent sub-variety’ of all other states of consciousness. It is the parent sub-
variety since all other ‘sub-varieties’ are ‘denuded’ insofar as they involve
privations of the powers or capacities that characterise the non-disordered
wakeful state. To this extent, the non-disordered wakeful state is a perfection
associated with a ‘syndrome’ of properties8 (74), properties that, says
O’Shaughnessy, ‘travel of necessity in groups’ (74).9 For instance, when
fully awake, one can perceive, think, imagine, make plans, and so on.
Other sub-varieties of the conscious state are likewise ‘syndromes’ of powers
or properties, but they are lacking insofar as they are ‘denuded’ of certain
powers relative to the parent sub-variety: wakefulness.
Wakefulness, then, is a state that is associated with a syndrome of
powers. Importantly, however, the state is more than a mere assembly or
constellation of such powers or properties. O’Shaughnessy oﬀers various
considerations in support of this supposition. The most striking provoca-
tion oﬀered is the following: in removing the state of consciousness, say, by
using an anaesthetic, one removes all the properties or powers. But to this
extent, the properties depend on the state, for the state explains their
presence. However, this is not all. As O’Shaughnessy also insists, modify-
ing the properties that realise the state also involves a modiﬁcation of the
state thereby realised. For example, consider the eﬀect that meditation has
on one’s wakeful experience. Or copious amounts of wine. Plainly, the
character of one’s conscious state is modiﬁed. But, as such, even while the
state explains the presence of the realising properties on which it depends
(remove consciousness and you remove the powers), the properties that
realise the state are also said to constitute it insofar as a modiﬁcation of the
powers involves a modiﬁcation of the state. This holism will be of some
import later. Before that O’Shaughnessy’s thinking must be detailed still
further.
Most, if not all, of the capacities ‘marshalled’ in the state of wakeful
consciousness involve what philosophers have designated, obscurely in my
view, as ‘the will’. O’Shaughnessy is peculiar, however, in distinguishing
two forms of willing – mental and bodily. The use of the will, says
O’Shaughnessy, is constitutive of wakeful consciousness, though critically
‘no experience utilising the bodily will is essential to [wakeful] conscious-
ness’ (88; my emphasis) – after all, we can be fully conscious ‘though supine
in a hammock’ (226). But this suggests an essential role for the mental will
8 This is not to say that one property of a state entails the other – some, though not all do. Rather
properties necessarily occur in sets that realise unique states of consciousness (75).
9 Note that properties of the state are powers of the subject in that state.
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in constituting wakeful consciousness. O’Shaughnessy captures this with a
necessity claim: ‘The mind of one who is conscious is necessarily a mind
actively governing the movement of its own attentive and thinking pro-
cesses’ (89). Let us understand by ‘mental willing’ this ‘active governing’.
As might be supposed, the liminality of the ‘bed-time window’ is apt to
throw such governance into disarray – at least when the subject is poised to
surrender her will to sleep. The question is how we should understand the
relation between mental activity and nocturnal regret. I begin to spell out
that connection in §3. First, I explore two other features of wakeful
consciousness – self-consciousness and temporal orientation – which, as I
argue, may be relevant to our exploration. I then attempt an application of
O’Shaughnessy’s ontological reﬂections on the state of wakefulness to the
case of regret.
2 Wakeful Consciousness: Self-Consciousness
and Orientation in Time
As we have noted, for O’Shaughnessy, wakeful consciousness enables a
cluster of capacities or powers in the subject, including the abilities to
sense-perceive and to engage in wilful action with one’s surroundings.
However, not all wakefully conscious creatures are self-conscious – for
O’Shaughnessy, a ‘higher’, ‘more developed form’ of consciousness (102).
I focus here on only one feature of O’Shaughnessy’s rich analysis of self-
consciousness: the property of self-awareness. I will suggest that there are
two broad respects in which self-awareness is explanatorily relevant to our
analysis. First, regret involves awareness of themode of one’s cogitations – I
spell this out shortly. Second, certain forms of nocturnal regretting, speci-
ﬁcally those that are insomniacal, may be apt to have the ‘self’ or ‘one’s life’
or ‘occurrent existence’ as one among their objects.
O’Shaughnessy supposes that the ‘advent of self-awareness’ brought
with it a new realm of awareness and knowledge – awareness of ‘the entire
realm of the mental’ (103). Unlike the ways in which the outer, non-mental
realm comes to be known, however, the objects of the ‘inner’ realm are
known immediately. ‘Thus, I know that I am now thinking this, I know I
now believe that, I know that I do so because I now observed such and
such’ (105).10 What is the scope of such immediate self-knowledge? For
one, the content of one’s thoughts and experiences are immediately
10 Though he also grants: ‘very occasionally we discover what is here and now occurring in our own
minds through inference and appeal to experience’ (105).
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known. Critically, one also knows theirmode – that is, one knows that one
is imagining rather than remembering, conjecturing rather than believing,
and so on. O’Shaughnessy draws a comparison with the dreaming subject
so as to make plain, or instruct, in what sense this is so.11 The dreamer, says
O’Shaughnessy, takes his imaginings to be seeings and is hence ignorant of
their ultimate character – viz. that they are imaginings. A like failure is said
to occur in mental illness (see also O’Shaughnessy 1972). A mentally ill
subject may take her wakeful imaginings to be real. But, as such, her
wakeful consciousness is thereby said to be ‘disordered’ or ill-formed.
What is meant by this normative charge?
A subject that is self-aware of the contents of her mental states and
occurrences is a subject that can encounter both the inner and outer world
‘under the aspect of truth’ (111). This notion is spelt out using the idiom of
‘comparison’:
(merely) animal consciousness, while it relates cognitively to the world, has
nothing to do with truth. Or perhaps better expressed: animals know truths
but not their truth. A dog knowing it is about to be fed, does not know it is
true that it is about to be fed. It could do so only if it could compare the
thought ‘I am about to be fed’ with the reality that makes it true (for truth
arises out of the matching of thought and reality). And this in turn requires
the knowledge that one has that thought, together with the capacity to
contemplate its denial as a possibility that is here in fact not realised. (111; my
emphasis)
This indicates the import of self-knowledge of the inner realm to the
possibility of encountering the world under the aspect of truth. Those
who mistake imaginings for reality are not in a position to encounter the
world in this guise. Accordingly, the consciousness of such a subject is
‘disordered’. I return to this supposition in §5. In what remains of this
section, another feature of wakeful consciousness is sketched: temporal
orientation. Again, the dreaming subject illuminates.Dream, as
O’Shaughnessy vividly notes, is a ‘Time Island’. The dream is created
‘anew in each instant’ (92), ‘in experiential mid-air’, ‘each instant [disen-
gaging] in certain signiﬁcant ways from its predecessor instants’ (91). But
this being so, he insists, the dreamer cannot be genuinely cognitively
orientated towards the dream past or future.
It might be asked what the status of this claim is. I take it that
O’Shaughnessy means it to be a piece of descriptive phenomenology. I
11 The dreaming subject often provides an important contrast case for O’Shaughnessy, and I use his
contrastive expository method here.
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hence leave to one side any kind of scepticism about the reality of dreams.
My goal is only to excavate a contrast with wakeful experience and here the
idea is that wakeful experience, if it is not disordered, does not have this
character. That is to say, in wakeful experience each instant is not experi-
enced as ‘disengaging in signiﬁcant ways from its predecessors’. Further,
and unlike the dreamer, the wakeful subject can entertain cognitive atti-
tudes to future and past times, including, through episodic memory,
attitudes to particular past times.12 Such observations then suggest an
initial way in which wakefulness and regret may be linked, namely, and
perhaps unsurprisingly, through the past. For if what is regretted are past
events or states of aﬀairs, and if regretting involves entertaining those
events as past, a dreaming subject is not in the cognitive position to
experience regret. It does not know the mode of its cogitations.
As might be supposed, there are diﬀerent ways in which the connection
between regret and the past can be spelt out. Jacobson (2013), for instance,
takes it that what is regretted are bad decisions and their consequences. On
this view, at least part of what is regretted is past error in deliberation.
BernardWilliams’ treatment of regret also makes special room for the past,
albeit in a distinct way. ForWilliams, what are regretted are states of aﬀairs,
some of which may be past. However, the peculiar way in which the past
bears on regret is not speciﬁcally due to the object of regret being past,
rather what matters is how that past state of aﬀairs is evaluated at the
present time when ‘looking back’. We can get a sense of how to read this
notion (as we will see, the perceptual analogy is not wholly coincidental) by
reﬂecting on one of his paradigm cases in ‘Moral Luck’ – his reimagining of
the life of the painter Gauguin.
Williams’ Gauguin deserts his family in Paris to realise his painterly
ambitions on Tahiti. It might be supposed appropriate that Gauguin
should regret his action, but, for Williams, this is not at all plain. He
sorts among two species of regret that are relevant to a consideration of
Gauguin’s aﬀective response – agent-regret and regret in general. It is worth
quoting in full the paragraph that distinguishes these two:
The constitutive thought of regret in general is something like ‘how much
better if it had been otherwise’ and the feeling can in principle apply to
anything of which one can form some conception of how it might have been
otherwise, together with consciousness of how things would then have been
better. In this general sense of regret, what are regretted are states of aﬀairs,
12 See Campbell (1994) for discussion of the distinction between temporal orientation with respect to
phase and with respect to particular times.
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and they can be regretted in principle by anyone who knows of them. But
there is a particularly important species of regret, which I shall call ‘agent-
regret’, which a person can only feel towards his own past actions (or, at
most, actions in which he regards himself as a participant). In this case, the
supposed possible diﬀerence is that one might have acted otherwise, and the
focus of the regret is on that possibility, the thought being formed in part by
ﬁrst-personal conceptions of how one might have acted otherwise. ‘Agent-
regret’ is not distinguished from regret in general solely or simply in virtue of
its subject-matter. There can be cases of regret directed towards one’s own
past actions which are not cases of agent-regret, because the past action is
regarded purely externally, as one might regard anyone else’s action. Agent-
regret requires not merely a ﬁrst-personal subject-matter, nor yet merely a
particular kind of psychological content, but also a particular kind of expres-
sion. (1976: 123)
Further,
regret necessarily involves a wish that things had been otherwise. But it does not
necessarily involve the wish that, all things taken together, one had acted
otherwise.
So, what kind of regret should we expect Gauguin to feel?
Presuming Gauguin had some awareness of the ‘claims’ (117) his family
had on him and what neglecting them amounted to, we might suppose
him prone to bouts of general regret. Here wemight imagine him regarding
his past action purely externally, and even wishing that things had been
otherwise – say, that his desires had not conﬂicted so irrevocably. Still, he
need not thereby wish that he had acted otherwise. In what circumstances
would he wish that he had so done?
Notoriously, Williams argues that Gauguin will wish to have acted
otherwise only in the event that he is unsuccessful in his ambitions as a
painter. Of course, his failure as a painter might be a matter of bad luck –
for example, he might have been injured on the way to Tahiti, in which
case ‘his decision . . . was for nothing . . . there is nothing in the outcome to
set against the other people’s loss’ (120). But although this kind of ‘external
luck’ renders (retroactively, for Williams) his decision unjustiﬁed, it does
not serve to ‘unjustify’ him, to show that he was wrong. Rather ‘what
would prove him wrong in his project would not just be that it failed but
that he failed.’ To wit: his failure as a painter would also reveal he failed at
the time of deliberation, namely in letting the dream of artistic experi-
mentation in Polynesia override the weight of his parental obligations. For
Williams, such a recognition should induce ‘agent-regret’.
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On Williams’ understanding, agent-regret can be only experienced
from a perspective or ‘standpoint of assessment’ that regrets the events
and actions – in this case Gauguin deserting his family – that shaped the
very possibility of occupying that standpoint. For only by leaving his
family in Paris could Gauguin actually come to occupy a standpoint
from which an assessment, negative in this case, is even so much as
possible. For Williams then, the way in which the past comes to be
negatively evaluated as regretful is through a concomitant evaluation of
the present, the contours of which have been constitutively shaped by
those past events.13
It is worth comparing the dream. In dream, there is no such experi-
ential orientation in time, nor is there any constitutive connection
between the dream past and dream present – the dream, recall,
is created ‘anew in each instant’ (O’Shaughnessy 2002: 92), ‘in experi-
ential mid-air’. Further, past dreamt events are only uniﬁed with pre-
sent dreamt conditions through the continuity of content that uniﬁes the
dream – both sectors are part of the same dream. Gauguin’s past
experience in Paris, however, is not related to his present experience
in Polynesia merely because they are part of the same life – his. Rather,
Gaugin’s present experience is such that it is partly shaped by things
that he did as well by things that happened to him as a matter of luck.
This invites an early attempt at isolating a connection between regret,
time, and, inter alia, wakefulness. If the objects of regret are past states of
aﬀairs or past errors in deliberation (Jacobson), or if regret involves any
kind of temporal orientation, including ‘looking back’ from one’s current
standpoint of assessment (Williams), it is unsurprising that regret necessi-
tates wakefulness and more particularly, as we shall later see, self-conscious
wakefulness. Why so? Dream experience precludes such temporal orienta-
tion. Still, this leaves unexplained the link between regret and insomnia.
Granted, the ‘bedtime’ window may precipitate reﬂection on the near and
distant past, but it might be wondered: why should the mere remembering
that regret sometimes involves preclude sleep? For instance, we know that
recalling past events for which one is grateful, and that so induce positive
aﬀect, can bring on sleep (Emmons andMcCullough 2003). But this being
so, neither the relevant object of regret being past, nor one’s temporal
orientation, pass explanatory muster in trying to elucidate a link between
regret and insomnia. I try a diﬀerent tack.
13 See Wallace 2014 for a deft analysis of the shortcomings of this view.
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3 Mental Activity and Wakefulness
Although wakefulness allows for temporal orientation, the mere fact of the
object of regret being past, and of constitutively shaping the current
standpoint of evaluation, does not yet explain why regret should induce
insomnia – this is what §2 sought to establish. There is, however, another
explanation. Recall O’Shaughnessy’s insistence that properly formed wake-
ful consciousness necessitates mental willing – the active governance of
one’s own mental acts. If acute, this gestures at a second link. Earlier I
quoted Zeelenberg and Pieters: regret ‘both stems from and produces
higher order cognitive processes’ (2007 : 5). But that regret may stem
from cognitive activity is largely unsurprising; at least certain episodes of
regretting may be preceded by active episodic recall, namely to provide the
episode with an object. There are, however, at least two other ways in
which regret and cognitive activity may be linked. This is what I spell out
in this section.
As we have noted, Jacobson (2013) pits deliberative error as the proper
object of regret; Bagnoli (2000) disagrees, invoking tragedy. Agamemnon
sacriﬁces Iphigenia at Aulis, but his decision is notmistaken; it is grounded
in what he takes to be an overriding reason – to please the gods. So is
Agamemnon thereby immune to regret? Surely, he is not. Bagnoli takes her
cue from Williams in explicating her alternative analysis.
In ‘Ethical Consistency’, Williams considers ways in which conﬂicts
in belief and desire diﬀer. Where two beliefs are consistent but con-
ﬂicting, the discovery that one of the beliefs is not true leads to its
abandonment:
The rejected belief cannot substantially survive . . . to decide that a belief is
untrue is to abandon, i.e. no longer to have that belief. (1973: 170)
Desires are diﬀerent in this respect. When two desires conﬂict but where
the conﬂict resides not merely in a contingent feature of the world, but
essentially – viz. where the world is such that it is impossible that both be
satisﬁed – the satisfaction of one desire does not always lead to an abandon-
ment of the other as it does in the case of belief. Rather, a rejected desire
may ‘reappear’ in another ‘guise’ – in particular, ‘the opportunity for
satisfying that desire having irrevocably gone, it may reappear in the
form of a regret for what was missed’ (170).14
14 Compare the case of conﬂicting desires that may be contingently satisﬁed: someone who is lazy and
thirsty may desire to remain seated while at the same time wanting to get up to get a drink. Were a
drink suddenly placed in arm’s reach, the conﬂict would dissipate.
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Bagnoli is impressed by this insight. Regret, for Williams, is residual in
the sense that, as Bagnoli puts it, it ‘stands for a value’ (174) – through the
experience of regret, the subject values an opportunity forgone in delibera-
tion. Regretting, then, is a mode of valuing. Even so, she maintains,
Williams gets the moral phenomenology of regretting wrong. Speciﬁcally,
he goes awry in seeing the peculiar agency that agent-regret involves as
symptomatic of value pluralism. I explain what is meant by this charge.
ForWilliams, moral values are not supreme.When acting in the context
of value pluralism, moral values may sometimes be overridden, precipitat-
ing regret. Consider Gauguin. In asking whether he was right to desert his
family, there is, for Williams, more than one ‘right’ – aesthetic values may
trump moral ones:
Perhaps fewer of us than is pretended care about the existence of Gauguin’s
paintings, but we are supposed to care . . . the fact is that if we believe in any
other values at all, then it is likely that at some point we shall have reason to
be glad that moral values . . . have been treated as one value among others,
and not as unquestionably supreme. (133)
Bagnoli insists that for Williams ‘regret . . . is elected as a signiﬁcant
element of the world of values, rather than as an attitude intelligible in
the perspective of the agent’ (175). Whether or not we agree with the ﬁrst
clause of her criticism, her appeal to the ﬁrst-person perspective should
surely resonate. Regret is an attitude that should be intelligible from that
perspective. In particular, we might wonder whether there is a phenom-
enological dimension to emphasising that demand for intelligibility.
As it happens, Williams does grant that diﬀerences in regret in general
and agent-regret shore up as ‘diﬀerences in the thoughts and images that
enter the sentiment’ (124 ) – a certain recognition of the phenomenological
dimensions of the ﬁrst-person perspective are not then absent in his
account. Still, Williams does not tell us how we should understand this
experiential diﬀerence between regret and agent-regret. Bagnoli’s work is
instructive in this respect. Bagnoli submits that regret is an emotion15 that
involves counterfactual patterns of thinking and imagining. But what
kinds of diﬀerences in the counterfactual thoughts and imaginings should
we suppose regret in general and agent-regret supporting?
Her thought is the following.16 Suppose a chorus were to ﬁctively
represent the alternatives that would have been available to Agamemnon
15 As will, of course, be clear by now, I too assume that regret is an emotion.
16 I have adapted her example for purposes of exposition.
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at Aulis – perhaps by performing those alternatives. The representation is
descriptive and the full range of alternatives available is determined, as
Williams would have it, by the way the world is. In contrast, the range of
alternatives that Agamemnon would have considered – presumably in
thoughts and images – is evaluative and is determined by what for the
agent were viable alternatives at the time of deliberation. Bagnoli’s idea,
drawing on Williams, is that, in regret, such thoughts and images may
reappear. What they represent in such instances, however, is not opportu-
nities missed due to how the world is or was, paceWilliams, but rather what
for the agent were potentially viable and valuable alternatives not taken up.
This phenomenal ‘reappearance’ of reasons makes plain the practical
signiﬁcance of regret.17 Regret ‘reminds’ the subject of reasons that were
supported but were not overriding. It hence ‘reminds’ the subject that
‘some more work has to be done’ (185) – for example, reparation needs to
be made, an excuse oﬀered, or forgiveness asked for, say. But to this extent,
as Bagnoli explains, ‘regret may have a motivational force insofar as it
provides the agent with a practical reason: it calls attention to a reason for
action. In calling attention to a reason for action regret can initiate a new
deliberation’ (185).18
This indicates a wholly diﬀerent way in which mental activity and regret
can be linked – regret can precipitate new chains of thinking. But if so, as I
think seems phenomenologically plausible, and if, too, O’Shaughnessy is
correct in postulating a constitutive link between wakefulness and mental
activity, it is hardly any wonder that regret induces sleeplessness. Why? For
it induces thinking and thinking necessitates wakefulness. At the same time,
however, there is no reason to think that regret is special in this respect. If
we are awake, we are bound to think – says O’Shaughnessy ‘the [wakeful]
conscious ﬁnd themselves in the grip of a necessity to freely choose their
own occupations of thought and attention’ (2002: 89). But, if so, the mere
fact that regret may precipitate thinking does not yet explain why regret
may induce insomnia. We can, however, ﬁnd the resources in Bagnoli’s
account to excavate a third link, one which, as I explain in later sections,
brings us closer to an explanation.
Though Bagnoli may have reason not to explicitly invoke Nico Frijda’s
conception of the ‘action tendency’, it seems natural to wonder whether
17 To make sense of how reasons can ‘phenomenally’ reappear, see Soteriou (2013).
18 For some sleepers, the relevant chains of deliberation are neither productive nor yield closure – such
subjects perceive their minds to be ‘racing’ (Schmidt, Harvey, and Van der Linden 2011), they
ruminate. Roese et al. (2009) identify a species of regret that they call ‘repetitive regret’ which
involves rumination.
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the peculiar action tendency of regret might not simply be to so think and
imagine. Jacobson’s sentimentalist treatment of regret invites such spec-
ulation. Sentiments, for Jacobson, form a class of emotion types, the nature
of which is open to empirical discovery. Like other emotions, sentiments
are, for Jacobsen, best conceived as ‘syndromes’ of thought, feeling, and
motivation – something that tallies with the O’Shaughnessy-inspired
approach explored in this chapter (see also Soteriou, Chapter 4 , this
volume). Unlike other emotions, however, the sentiments are apt to dis-
play two further features. First, they exhibit stable recalcitrance – they tend
not to be responsive to belief. Second, and critically, they issue in acting
without thinking. In the case of regret, however, this sparks a further
puzzle. For consider: if the peculiar action tendency of regret is just to
counterfactually think and imagine, and if action tendencies are typically
discharged without thinking, can we really make sense of those mental
actions as action tendencies that can, as it were, be performed without
thinking? Further, we might wonder: how do such putative ‘mental action
tendencies’ compare with those of other sentiments? Someone in the grip
of rage may ‘lash out’, stamp their feet, slam doors. Those who are fearful
may tremble and ﬂee. But in what sense could regret involve actingwithout
thinking in any analogous sense, if at all?
Jacobson does not address this issue, suggesting only that regret prompts
a ‘policy change’ for future action; it has practical signiﬁcance insofar as it
involves a motivation to act diﬀerently next time. It might be queried,
however, just how acute this generalisation is. The notion of ‘policy
change’ may have little traction in cases where the acts or outcomes
regretted are highly idiosyncratic. Worse, it seems that regret is sometimes
compatible with a complete failure of policy change, as in cases of akrasia.
But if such motivation towards policy change is the peculiar ‘action
tendency of regret’, and if sentiments are partly distinguished from emo-
tions in having speciﬁc and even empirically discoverable action tenden-
cies, are such episodes less ‘sentimental’ or less canonically episodes of
‘regret’ for all that? If anything, surely the regret that is experienced there-
after is even more bitterly felt?19
In the next section, I try to bring these twin observations into syn-
chrony: the supposition that the peculiar action tendency of regret is to
counterfactually think and imagine as well as the thought that regret can
sometimes issue in ‘thoughtless’ thinking and imagining and so have a
19 As Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) report, ‘inactions’ – failures to act – are apt to generate even more
regret than actions.
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characteristic action tendency even in cases of inaction or where regret does
not or cannot motivate ‘policy change’. Here my argument harnesses
aspects of Williams’ account that remain unexplored in the literature but
which I consider deserve further consideration – speciﬁcally his insight that
agent-regret has a peculiar mode of expression, and that it involves a wish. I
will claim that sometimes regret can issue in mental expressive actions that
can be understood as expressive of a wish. And this in turn will allow me to
reassert the signiﬁcance of Williams’ connection between regret and one’s
present occupation of a ‘standpoint of assessment’, one’s self-conscious
occupation of which, as I will argue, can sometimes preclude sleep.
4 Wishing, Reparation, and Inaction
Goldie (2000) distinguishes among expressions of emotion that are actions
and those that are not – for instance, autonomic nervous responses like
sweating and muscular reactions like ﬂinching. These latter expressions are
not something one does. Expressions of emotion that are actions, however,
are distinguished from actions that are not expressions of emotion, and this
is so even if emotion can sometimes precipitate actions that have all the
hallmarks of being an emotional expressive action but that are not. For
example, say in the presence of a bull, I decide to ﬂee. Though I may feel
fear in the presence of the bull, I ﬂee in order to escape the bull’s presence.
Let us say that my ﬂeeing is a reasoned action out of emotion. Though I feel
fear, I was cognitively and conatively, and not aﬀectively, moved to act.
Compare the following case. I ﬂee in fear. In this case, say, the action is
not adequately explained by a belief/desire pair.20 I do not any more ﬂee
with the aim of removing myself from the bull’s presence. I am moved by
feeling. Actions that are performed in emotion are genuine expressions of
emotion, says Goldie. And they are genuine since they are not done as a
means to some further end. Compare a caress that is intended to demon-
strate love, to one that unfolds spontaneously in an act of love.
We can apply this distinction to our earlier discussion. Although
regret may sometimes precipitate actions that are reasoned actions
performed out of emotion – new episodes of deliberation which may
themselves involve counterfactual patterns of thinking or imagining,
or even, as Williams insists, concrete acts of reparation – it may
20 It might be queried whether the ‘standard’ story of action causation that appeals to belief/desire
pairs is apt even to non-expressive action (see Hornsby 2010) – I assume it is, but only for expository
purposes.
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also, or so I am suggesting, involve actions that are performed in
emotion, speciﬁcally the mental actions of counterfactually thinking
and imagining.
It is worth noting that Bagnoli’s position seems to hybridise both these
forms of action – actions performed both in and out of the experience of
regret. For consider: reasons ‘reappear’ and call for attention and they have
a motivating force, namely to initiate new deliberations. But those reap-
pearing reasons and imaginings are not projects undertaken by the subject to
achieve some end. Rather, in regret, as I am claiming, the subject just tends
to counterfactually think and imagine.
Let us say, then, that in regret the subject may sometimes engage in
mental expressive actions that are not merely produced by regret – that are
not merely outputs of the state regret – but are, in part, the regretting. This
claim requires further clariﬁcation and indeed justiﬁcation – a task for
elsewhere. For now, I raise two considerations that are pertinent to a more
careful delineation of the notion of a mental expressive action. First, it
might be supposed that if regret does involve mental expressive action, then
there ought to be some way of showing that the kinds of mental expressive
actions that regret involves are continuous in kind with those expressive
actions that have so far been considered in the literature – so-called
arational actions; those of the grieving for example, when they embrace
the garments of a loved one who has died (Hursthouse 1991). Second, if this
kind of analysis is vaguely on the right track and if regret is indeed a
sentiment that sometimes issues in mentally acting without thinking, then
it seems there needs to be some way of explaining why regret, like other
sentiments, can nonetheless be stably recalcitrant. For prima facie, if regret
involves counterfactual patterns of imagining and thinking, then regret,
surely, ought not to be impervious to belief.
I suggest that two features of Williams’ original account should be
recovered so as to make conceptual space for, and accommodate, these
considerations: ﬁrst, Williams’ insight that agent-regret has a particular
mode of expression and, second, his emphasis not on reasons (like Bagnoli),
but wishes.21 Williams, in recruiting the concept of ‘expression’ seems to
have had concrete expressive acts of reparation in mind. I will instead
emphasise expressive mental actions. Further, while Williams insists that
regret may involve a wish that things had been otherwise, I shall contend
21 Note this is a diﬀerence of emphasis: one may after all claim that reasons play the role Bagnoli thinks
they play only conditional on the presence of a wish. Thanks to Fabrice Teroni for emphasising this
point.
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that regret may involve the wish that things be diﬀerent now. In this, I take
my inspiration from Goldie.
For Goldie, wishes that are not idle desires (like the desire to be taller, say)
involve not just desiring the thing or state of aﬀairs wished for, but imagining
or being disposed to imagine that the desire is satisﬁed (2000: 28). And this
helps him spell out in what sense wishes are operative in expressive actions.
Such actions are, says Goldie, the imaginative expression of a wish. When a
grieving subject caresses the clothes of the loved one who has died, the
clothes are imaginatively invested with symbolic signiﬁcance – the subject
imagines that she is really caressing the person who has died and her
imaginative act is expressive of the wish that she really be caressing that
person. Though she is aware of what she is doing – she does not believe that
by caressing their garments she caresses them – she nonetheless imagines her
wish to be satisﬁed. Accordingly, she wishes that things were diﬀerent now. As
Goldie explains, ‘the symbolic nature of the expression takes place as it does
partly because the literal action, as it were, is not a realistic option’ (29).
CompareWilliams on agent-regret: the agent will act in some way ‘which he
hopes will constitute or at least symbolise some kind of recompense or
restitution and this will be an expression of his agent-regret (1973: 124 ; my
emphasis).
Though Goldie considers expressive actions that involve imaginative
relations to external objects – a cushion, for example, may be co-opted for
the person one wants to pummel – it is not, I think, diﬃcult to appreciate
in what sense regret might involve wishes of a similar kind, and perhaps
especially so in cases where the regretted situation is beyond mending or
where, as Goldie puts it, ‘literal action . . . is not a realistic option’. In this
case the suggestion is that one may counterfactually imagine not only
how things might have been, but how things could have been now, where
such imagining is expressive of the wish that things really be that way.22
My only defence of this claim is that it strikes me as phenomenologically
plausible.23 But there are explanatory advantages to the approach too. For
example, while we can allow that valued reasons can sometimes ‘reappear’
in the guise of regret, we need not insist that this is all there is to the
phenomenology of regretting. Since wishes need not track considered
22 On this understanding, one may even ﬁnd oneself surprised by one’s wishes – that is, one may be
surprised to ﬁnd oneself imagining as one does. To this extent, actions that are expressive of a wish
need not always be intelligible from the perspective of the agent, pace Bagnoli. Instead, regret may
provide an opportunity for insight, not just a reminder ‘that more work has to be done’.
23 See Gordon 1992 for descriptive phenomenological reports of experienced regret based on dialogical
interviews.
204 clare mac cumhaill
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/11418273/WORKINGFOLDER/NAARNI/9781107110540C10.3D 205 [187–208] 16.9.2017
3:21PM
reasons or desires that ‘reappear’, wholly hitherto unconsidered alternatives
or visions of how things now could be may, for the ﬁrst time, ‘appear’.
Again, this strikes me as phenomenologically resonant. Further, since such
expressive actions unfold in regret, they are not best thought of as projects
that the subject undertakes, which in turn preserves Jacobson’s insight
regarding the sentimentality of regret: since wishes are not always answer-
able to beliefs, such regret can be recalcitrant. In sum, this now suggests
three distinct ways in which mental activity may be involved in occurrent
regretting: through active episodic recall, through precipitating new chains
of deliberation, or through the mental expressive actions of counterfac-
tually imagining and thinking. But even if this much is granted – and
naturally there is a great deal more to say – our original puzzle still stands. If
regret and wakefulness are linked through mental action – be it reasoned
action out of emotion or, as I am suggesting here, mental activity that is
expressive of regret – why is it the case that regret is sometimes not merely
incompatible with sleep, but may preclude falling asleep?
To get a sense of why we are left with a residual puzzle, it is instructive to
consider a case that Bagnoli frames in furthering her claim that the object
of regret is a valued alternative supported by good but not overriding
reasons. She introduces us to Jackie. Jackie chose between two diﬀerent
life paths – to pursue architecture or modern dance. She chose the ﬁrst and
considers this decision the right one. Nonetheless, she regrets not being a
dancer. As Bagnoli admits, Jackie’s regret might seem odd. On many
accounts, it might even come out as inappropriate or irrational. Bagnoli’s
account however, as well as mine, can divert this charge – through regret,
Jackie may value that alternative, perhaps sometimes imagining her wish to
be satisﬁed. Still, if Jackie’s regret keeps her awake at night, then it seems to
me that we might be inclined to suspect that something is, after all, amiss
with Jackie’s regretting. Speciﬁcally, it seems we might be disinclined to
believe her when she says that she considers that she made the right
decision in choosing to become an architect. So, what then is speciﬁc to
those forms of nocturnal regret which are such that insomnia may result?
5 Self-Conscious Regret
In the course of this chapter, I have appealed to diﬀerent properties of the
wakeful state, and so properties of the subject in that state so as to motivate
a link between regret and wakefulness. Since wakefulness enables in its
subject the power to experience the passage of time and to relate, through
episodic memory, to particular past times, and since regret constitutively
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involves mental activity of various sorts, including, as I have suggested,
mental action that is expressive of a wish, it should be plain that regret is an
aﬀective state of the wakeful. In closing, I suggest that these twin features
can be united through a further dimension of the wakeful state, one that
ﬁnally allows us to resolve the diﬃculty of seeing how it is that occurrent
regret may sometimes preclude falling asleep.
I have suggested that sometimes the regretful subject may imagine that
her wish that things be otherwise is satisﬁed now. Earlier, I set out
O’Shaughnessy thought that only the wakeful subject can apply the
indexical ‘now’. So, what capacities are involved in a subject’s imagining
that her wish is satisﬁed now?
As we have noted, only a self-conscious, wakeful subject can encounter
the world under the aspect ‘truth’ – that is, only a self-conscious, wakeful
subject can compare the thought ‘p’ with the reality that makes p true,
where ‘this in turn requires the knowledge that one has that thought,
together with the capacity to contemplate its denial as a possibility that is
here in fact not realised’ (O’ Shaughnessy 2002: 111). But regret, surely,
involves a like capacity. The regretful subject, even while imagining that
her wish is satisﬁed now, is aware that she is imagining – she is self-aware of
the propermode of her cogitations. But, as such, she is aware too that what
she is now imagining is not now realised. This is why her imagining is an
expression of her regret.
Return to Jackie. Suppose that Jackie’s regret keeps her awake. Why might
we be inclined to suppose that there is something awry with Jackie’s regret-
ting? Jackie claims that she is happy with her life as an architect and what she,
on one understanding, thereby is: an architect. But surely her nocturnal regret
speaks against this. Anthony Kenny expresses a similar doubt:
If a man says that he is afraid of winning £10,000 in the pools, we want to
ask himmore: does he believe that money corrupts, or does he expect to lose
his friends, or to be annoyed by begging letters, or what? If we can elicit from
him only descriptions of the good aspects of the situation then we cannot
understand why he reports his emotion as fear and not as hope. (1963: 134 )
My claim is not that the case of Jackie is incoherent, but only that if her
regret induces insomnia, we might have reason to query the extent to
which Jackie knows her ownmind. Perhaps she would prefer to dance after
all. But if so, then it is plausible that the object of Jackie’s regret is (some
variation on) the standpoint of assessment that she now occupies, perhaps
the life she now leads, or maybe the person who leads that life: herself. So
why should such regretting, which has such objects, preclude sleep?
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In reﬂecting earlier on the ‘holism’ that characterises states of conscious-
ness and their properties, we noted that in removing the state of wakeful
consciousness, say, by the use of anaesthesia, one removes the properties. In
contrast, modifying the properties involves modifying the state. Applying
this to the state of regret, itself a modiﬁcation of wakeful consciousness, we
might therefore expect two distinct therapeutic approaches to resolving
regret-induced insomnia: those aimed at modifying the properties that
constitute the state of regret (and that thereby modify the state), and those
aimed at removing the state of regret directly.
There is at least some evidence for such a twofold approach. Davis and
colleagues (1995) contend that those who experience regret either tend to
overestimate the extent to which the alternatively imagined scenarios were
possible, or the degree to which they had genuine control over the outcome of
a given situation.24 Resolving such regret involves downplaying the sense in
which the relevant alternative was genuinely possible. But if what I have
suggested is right, such an intervention may not resolve regret that is expres-
sive of a wish. For such regrets may be more recalcitrant to reason.
A distinct approach aims at rationalising a discrepancy between one’s
values and actions, where the experience of regret may be regarded as
expressive of one’s evaluative perspective (see also Betzler 2004). But to
this extent, the experience of regret may in fact reassure – despite what one
has done, one’s values are intact and hence, to a certain extent, oneself.
Thus reassured the subject can seek to rationalise, if not justify or excuse,
regretful action on other grounds.
For other subjects, however, it is clear that the experience of regret seems
not to reassure at all – it may not ‘remind’ the subject of who they are
precisely because who-they-are is the object of their regret. As Fisher and
Exline explain:
Regret can involve a sense of damage or loss focused on a person’s core
identity, as suggested by such statements as, ‘I used to be a conscientious
person before I did this act’ or ‘I could have been a brilliant musician if I
would have made better choices.’ (2010: 556)
Such may be Jackie’s diﬃculty. But if this is so, then to resolve such regret
it seems that one must remove, not the properties or powers that constitute
the state – for instance, it is not merely enough to stem the ﬂow of
counterfactual thinking and imagining – but the state itself. Since,
24 On Williams’ approach, this would not preclude regret, but might allow for a transmutation of
agent-regret into regret in general.
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however, the object of regret – the subject – is in the state, to remove the
state, one must deprive the state of its object. But how? Therapeutic
approaches that focus on acceptance and self-forgiveness seem to focus
on resolving regret along these lines, so that one’s self, or, simply, the
person one takes oneself to be, is no longer an object of regret.
This ﬁnally suggests a way in which regret may not merely be incompa-
tible with sleep, but may preclude falling asleep. If the object of one’s regret
is oneself or, more minimally, one’s standpoint of assessment, it is not just
the case that one is awake because one is regretting, but rather to regretwhat
one regrets – oneself and perhaps even (aspects of) one’s existence – one
cannot fall asleep. For what one regrets can only be wakefully ‘given’ to one:
oneself.
Conclusion
I have appealed to diﬀerent properties of the wakeful state so as to motivate
a link between regret and wakefulness. If correct, regret is essentially an
aﬀective state of the wakeful. In particular, I have tried to motivate a
position on which the cognitive activity that attends regret may sometimes
occur in emotion and be expressive of a wish – a ‘strangely enchanted’
expressive mental action. Finally, I have attempted to forge a link between
regret and insomnia, not just by appeal to temporal orientation or cogni-
tive activity, which, if O’Shaughnessy is correct necessitate wakefulness,
but to the self-conscious subject, something that is lost in sleep and dream.
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